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07-01-2011, 05:16 PM
BUSBAR PROTECTION.ppt (Size: 731.5 KB / Downloads: 822)
What is a bus bar?
Causes of fault
Selection of CT ratios
Behaviour of protective CT (saturated CT)
Types of faults
Overcoming the faults
What is a bus bar?
Bus derived from Latin word
(common for all)
Nerve centre of the power system
Causes of fault
Breakdown of insulation because of over voltages
Weakening of insulation because of ageing
Failure of connected equipment
Why differential protection?
Terminals of the system near to each other
Installation of CTs
Easy comparison of current entering and leaving
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12-03-2011, 02:40 PM
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18-07-2011, 11:59 AM
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19-07-2011, 10:36 AM
you can refer these page details of "BUSBAR PROTECTION"link bellow
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27-07-2011, 09:13 AM
123.doc (Size: 5.08 MB / Downloads: 160)
The protection scheme for a power system should cover the whole system against all probable types of fault. Unrestricted forms of line protection, such as overcurrent and distance systems, meet this requirement, although faults in the busbar zone are cleared only after some time delay. But if unit protection is applied to feeders and plant, the busbars are not inherently protected. Busbars have often been left without specific protection, for one or more of the following reasons:
a. the busbars and switchgear have a high degree of reliability, to the point of being regarded as intrinsically safe
b. it was feared that accidental operation of busbar protection might cause widespread dislocation of the power system, which, if not quickly cleared, would cause more loss than would the very infrequent actual bus faults
c. it was hoped that system protection or back-up protection would provide sufficient bus protection if needed It is true that the risk of a fault occurring on modern metal-clad gear is very small, but it cannot be entirely ignored. However, the damage resulting from one uncleared fault, because of the concentration of fault MVA, may be very extensive indeed, up to the complete loss of the station by fire. Serious damage to or destruction of the installation would probably result in widespread and prolonged supply interruption. Finally, system protection will frequently not provide the cover required. Such protection may be good enough for small distribution substations, but not for important stations. Even if distance protection is applied to all feeders, the busbar will lie in the second zone of all the distance protections, so a bus fault will be cleared relatively slowly, and the resultant duration of the voltage dip imposed on the rest of the system may not be tolerable. With outdoor switchgear the case is less clear since, although the likelihood of a fault is higher, the risk of widespread damage resulting is much less. In general then, busbar protection is required when the system protection does not cover the busbars, or when, in order to maintain power system stability, high-speed fault clearance is necessary. Unit busbar protection provides this, with the further advantage that if the busbars are sectionalised, one section only need be isolated to clear a fault. The case for unit busbar protection is in fact strongest when
there is sectionalisation.
2. Busbar faults
The majority of bus faults involve one phase and earth, but faults arise from many causes and a significant number are interphase clear of earth. In fact, a large proportion of busbar faults result from human error rather than the failure of switchgear components.
With fully phase-segregated metalclad gear, only earth faults are possible, and a protection scheme need have earth fault sensitivity only. In other cases, an ability to respond to phase faults clear of earth is an advantage, although the phase fault sensitivity need not be very high.
Although not basically different from other circuit protection, the key position of the busbar intensifies the emphasis put on the essential requirements of speed and stability. The special features of busbar protection are discussed below.
Busbar protection is primarily concerned with:
a. limitation of consequential damage
b. removal of busbar faults in less time than could be achieved by back-up line protection,
with the object of maintaining system stability
Some early busbar protection schemes used a low impedance differential system having a relatively long operation time, of up to 0.5 seconds. The basis of most modern schemes is a differential system using either low impedance biased or high impedance unbiased relays capable of operating in a time of the order of one cycle at a very moderate multiple of fault setting. To this must be added the operating time of the tripping relays, but an overall tripping time of less than two cycles can be achieved. With high-speed circuit breakers, complete fault clearance may be obtained in approximately 0.1 seconds. When a frame-earth system is used, the operating speed is comparable.
The stability of bus protection is of paramount importance. Bearing in mind the low rate of fault incidence, amounting to no more than an average of one fault per busbar in twenty years, it is clear that unless the stability of the protection is absolute, the degree of disturbance to which the power system is likely to be subjected may be increased by the installation of bus protection. The possibility of incorrect operation has, in the past, led to hesitation in applying bus protection and has also resulted in application of some very complex systems. Increased understanding of the response of differential systems to transient currents enables such systems to be applied with confidence in their fundamental stability. The theory of differential protection is given later in Section 7
Notwithstanding the complete stability of a correctly applied protection system, dangers exist in practice for a number of reasons. These are:
a. interruption of the secondary circuit of a current
transformer will produce an unbalance, which might cause tripping on load depending on the relative values of circuit load and effective setting. It would certainly do so during a through fault, producing substantial fault current in the circuit in
b. a mechanical shock of sufficient severity may
cause operation, although the likelihood of this occurring with modern numerical schemes is
c. accidental interference with the relay, arising from
a mistake during maintenance testing, may lead to operation
In order to maintain the high order of integrity needed for busbar protection, it is an almost invariable practice to make tripping depend on two independent measurements of fault quantities. Moreover, if the tripping of all the breakers within a zone is derived from common measuring relays, two separate elements must be operated at each stage to complete a tripping operation. Although not current practice, in many cases the relays are separated by about 2 metres so that no reasonable accidental mechanical interference to both relays simultaneously is possible.
The two measurements may be made by two similar differential systems, or one differential system may be checked by a frame-earth system, by earth fault relays energised by current transformers in the transformer neutral-earth conductors or by overcurrent relays. Alternatively, a frame-earth system may be checked by earth fault relays.
If two systems of the unit or other similar type are used, they should be energised by separate current transformers in the case of high impedance unbiased differential schemes. The duplicate ring CT cores may be mounted on a common primary conductor but independence must be maintained throughout the secondary circuit.
In the case of low impedance, biased differential schemes that cater for unequal ratio CT's, the scheme can be energised from either one or two separate sets of main current transformers. The criteria of double feature operation before tripping can be maintained by the provision of two sets of ratio matching interposing CT's per circuit. When multi-contact tripping relays are used, these are also duplicated, one being energised from each discriminating relay; the contacts of the tripping relay are then series-connected in pairs to provide tripping outputs.
Separate tripping relays, each controlling one breaker only, are usually preferred. The importance of such relays is then no more than that of normal circuit protection, so no duplication is required at this stage. Not least among the advantages of using individual tripping relays is the simplification of trip circuit wiring, compared with taking all trip circuits associated with a given bus section through a common multi-contact tripping relay.
In double busbar installations, a separate protection system is applied to each section of each busbar; an overall check system is provided, covering all sections of both busbars. The separate zones are arranged to overlap the busbar section switches, so that a fault on the section switch trips both the adjacent zones. This has sometimes been avoided in the past by giving the section switch a time advantage; the section switch is tripped first and the remaining breakers delayed by 0.5 seconds.
Only the zone on the faulty side of the section switch will remain operated and trip, the other zone resetting and retaining that section in service. This gain, applicable only to very infrequent section switch faults, is obtained at the expense of seriously delaying the bus protection for all other faults. This practice is therefore not generally favoured. Some variations are dealt with later under the more detailed scheme descriptions. There are many combinations possible, but the essential principle is that no single accidental incident of a secondary nature shall be capable of causing an unnecessary trip of a bus section.
Security against maloperation is only achieved by increasing the amount of equipment that is required to function to complete an operation; and this inevitably increases the statistical risk that a tripping operation due to a fault may fail. Such a failure, leaving aside the question of consequential damage, may result in disruption of the power system to an extent as great, or greater, than would be caused by an unwanted trip. The relative risk of failure of this kind may be slight, but it has been thought worthwhile in some instances to provide a guard in this respect as well.
Security of both stability and operation is obtained by providing three independent channels (say X, Y and Z) whose outputs are arranged in a 'two-out-of three' voting arrangement, as shown in Figure 1